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Corporate investment and stock liquidity: Evidence on the price impact 
of trade
Moonsoo Kang Wei Wang Chanyoung Eom
abstract
We document that corporate investment contributes to stock liquidity. This study demonstrates a positive rela­
tionship between abnormal corporate investment and stock liquidity in the cross-section. Moreover, stock liquid­
ity improves more apparently for firms with financial constraints. Our robustness check confirms that the 
existing regularities cannot explain the current finding. This analysis suggests that corporate investment de­
creases the risk of a firm and that a change in the risk affects the behavior of a market maker, leading to an in­






The recent corporate investment literature documents that optimal 
corporate investment changes the risk of a stock (Berk, Green, & Naik, 
1999). Then how does a change in the risk of a stock affect stock liquid­
ity? The market microstructure literature addresses that a change in the 
risk affects the pricing strategy of market makers, leading to a change in 
the price impact, i.e. stock liquidity (Kyle, 1985). In this analysis, we es­
tablish a link between corporate investment and stock liquidity by 
connecting this line of corporate investment study to the market micro­
structure literature. Specifically, we provide empirical evidence on the 
role of corporate investment in shaping stock liquidity and argue that 
the risk shift from corporate investment contributes to stock liquidity.
We motivate the current study as follows. In their seminal paper, 
Berk et al. (1999) argue that corporate investment decision can be eval­
uated in a real options context because the decision to invest converts 
growth options into assets in place. Thus, if growth opportunities are fi­
nite, corporate investment decision changes the ratio of growth options 
to assets in place, i.e. the asset risk of a firm, leading to a change in the 
risk of its stock. In other words, the risk of a stock relates to current 
and historical investment decisions of the firm. (Carlson, Fisher, & 
Giammarino, 2004) Specifically, optimal corporate investment de­
creases the risk of a stock, mostly its systematic part. Even when the 
new assets are risky, they are less risky than the options they replace. 
(Carlson, Fisher, & Giammarino, 2006).1 This line of study contributes 
to the asset pricing literature by exploring the implications of corporate 
investment for the cross section and time series of expected returns. 
Berk et al. (1999) are among the first to construct a dynamic real options 
model by analyzing the risk change in the context of corporate invest­
ment. Carlson et al. (2004), Zhang (2005), Li, Livdan, and Zhang 
(2009), and Liu, Whited, and Zhang (2009) are in line with the model.
1 Our robustness analysis shows that higher corporate investment leads to lower return 
volatility, that is, lower risk. Therefore, corporate investment decreases the risk of a stock, 
which could be due to either idiosyncratic or systematic risk or both.
2 Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) propose a differential effect of the market risk on 
high- and low-risk stocks while both Comerton-Forde et al. (2010) and Nagel (2012) em­
pirically demonstrate that high-risk stocks are more prone to market-wide liquidity 
shocks.
On the other hand, stock liquidity is endogenously determined. In par­
ticular, stock liquidity is governed by different trade motives such as pri­
vate information (Kyle, 1985; Glosten & Milgrom, 1985) and liquidity 
(Admati & Pfleiderer, 1988). As both trade motives are subject to the risk 
of a stock, a change in the risk leads market makers to change the pricing 
strategy, affecting the price impact. Specifically, Kyle (1985) proposes that 
at the equilibrium, the risk of a stock shows a negative relationship with 
stock liquidity. Moreover, the recent liquidity literature provides evidence 
on a negative association between the systematic component of the risk 
and stock liquidity.2 Taken together, regardless of the risk source or struc­
ture, a change in the risk of a stock negatively co-varies with stock liquidity.
By combining these two lines of study, we can hypothesize that cor­
porate investment affects stock liquidity through the pricing strategy of 
market makers. Specifically, we conjecture that optimal corporate in­
vestment improves stock liquidity by lowering the risk of a stock. To 
our best knowledge, this study is the first empirical analysis linking cor­
porate investment to stock liquidity by emphasizing the risk shift from 
corporate investment.
To address this association, we develop a research design to capture 
the effect of an exogenous change in corporate investment on stock li­
quidity. Specifically, following Titman, Wei, and Xie (2005), we define 
corporate investment as the deviation from the prior three-year moving 
average corporate investment. This approach minimizes a firm-fixed ef­
fect by removing a persistent characteristic from a raw variable. Then, 
we employ abnormal corporate investment as an exogenous shock 
and investigate the cross-sectional relationship between abnormal cor­
porate investment and subsequent stock liquidity. In the meantime, the 
literature addresses that there is the feedback effect of stock liquidity on 
corporate investment.3 As a determinant of required returns (Acharya & 
Pedersen, 2005), stock liquidity expands the set of profitable invest­
ment opportunities and increases corporate investment. (Derrien & 
Kecskes, 2013: Becker-Blease & Paul, 2006). Therefore, we also investi­
gate if our analysis is subject to the endogeneity issue.4
3 Bond, Edmans, and Goldstein (2012) provide an excellent survey on the feedback ef­
fect of stock market on the real economy.
4 We thank the reviewer for pointing out this issue.
5 See Hubbard (1998) and Stein (2003) for the classical corporate investment literature 
review.
6 Whited and Wu (2006), Gomes et al. (2006), and Livdan, Shapriza, and Lu (2009) ex­
plain the relationship between financial constraints risk and stock returns. 7 We thank the reviewer for pointing out this issue.
Our empirical analysis shows that corporate investment indeed con­
tributes to stock liquidity. First, a portfolio analysis illustrates that stock 
liquidity is significantly high for firms with a high level of corporate in­
vestment. Specifically, we sort a universe of stocks based on past stock 
liquidity and abnormal corporate investment every year. After a fiscal 
year ends, firms with a high level of corporate investment exhibit a 
high level of stock liquidity while firms with a low level of corporate in­
vestment present a low level of stock liquidity for both corporate invest­
ment measures. To comply with the corporate investment literature, we 
employ two measures for corporate investment: capital expenditure 
and capital expenditure plus R&D.
Second, the cross-sectional regression analysis confirms the role of 
corporate investment in shaping subsequent stock liquidity. In particu­
lar, when we run the Fama and MacBeth (1973) type yearly cross­
sectional regression, abnormal corporate investment is positively asso­
ciated with subsequent stock liquidity even after controlling for well- 
known determinants such as past stock liquidity and several stock char­
acteristics. This result holds for both corporate investment measures. 
We observe that this pattern lasts for three months after a fiscal year 
ends while it gets statistically weaker beyond the horizon.
Furthermore, we examine whether financial constraints have an im­
pact on the relationship between corporate investment and stock li­
quidity. Since Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) address the effect 
of financial constraints on corporate investment, many studies investi­
gate the relationship between imperfect capital market and corporate 
investment.5 As financial constraints prevent firms from financing all 
the desired investments, financially-constrained firms are less likely to 
respond to profitable investment opportunities, as shown in Kaplan 
and Zingales (1997). In other words, for the same level of corporate in­
vestment, investment opportunities are more likely to be profitable for 
financially-constrained firm than for financially-unconstrained firms 
other things equal. This intuition is consistent with a decreasing margin­
al productivity of investment opportunity. Therefore, we hypothesize 
that given any change in corporate investment, financially-constrained 
firms are likely to experience a greater risk shift and show a stronger ef­
fect on stock liquidity.6
Table 1
Descriptive statistics.
This table presents descriptive summary statistics for the data set. AMH is the logarithm of 
the Amihud (2002) daily liquidity measure which is an absolute daily return scaled by dai­
ly dollar trade volume measured over one month after the fiscal year ends. CAP (or CRD) is 
capital expenditure (plus R&D), scaled by beginning-of-year assets and subtracted from 
the prior three-year moving average capital expenditure (plus R&D). SIZE is the firm size 
defined as the logarithm of capitalization in the month that the fiscal year ends. PRC is the 
logarithm of a stock price in the month that the fiscal year ends. TNV is the average of the 
logarithm of daily turnover in the month that the fiscal year ends. VOL is the logarithm of 
the standard deviation of daily stock return in the month that the fiscal year ends. RET is a 
stock return in the fiscal year. CB is cash balance, scaled by beginning-of-year assets. The 
sample spans the year of 1971 to 2012.
Mean Std. dev. 1% Median 99%
AMH -16.579 2.624 -22.355 -16.587 -10.919
CAP - 0.012 0.197 - 0.270 - 0.005 0.220
CRD - 0.014 0.251 - 0.349 - 0.006 0.271
SIZE 11.986 1.751 8.767 11.801 16.717
PRC 2.569 0.963 0.048 2.659 4.466
TNV - 6.407 1.053 - 9.102 - 6.331 -4.150
VOL - 3.669 0.550 - 4.949 - 3.672 - 2.329
RET 0.174 0.620 - 0.678 0.072 2.383
CB 0.263 2.672 0.002 0.092 1.826
Our analysis shows that corporate investment indeed exhibits a 
stronger effect on stock liquidity for financially-constrained firms. 
Using two financial constraints measures such as the Kaplan and 
Zingales (1997; KZ) index and firm size, we sort a universe of stocks 
on financial constraints every year and analyze these two groups sepa­
rately. The cross-sectional analysis shows that it is financially- 
constrained firms such as high KZ-index or small firms that drive the as­
sociation between corporate investment and stock liquidity. Specifical­
ly, high KZ-index or small firms exhibit a significant effect of corporate 
investment on stock liquidity while low KZ-index or big firms show a 
weaker effect. After all, confirming the effect of market frictions on cor­
porate investment, this analysis shows that financial constraints indeed 
interact with corporate investment in shaping stock liquidity.
In the robustness check, we explore an alternative explanation for 
the corporate investment-stock liquidity relationship. First, we examine 
whether optimal corporate investment indeed decreases the risk of a 
stock. Given that corporate investment relates to mostly the systematic 
risk of a stock, one might question the effect of corporate investment on 
total risk and therefore the implication for stock liquidity. However, our 
analysis confirms that corporate investment indeed reduces the total 
risk of a stock.7 Second, we investigate the feedback effect of stock li­
quidity on corporate investment. Using the two-stage least square anal­
ysis (2SLS), we directly control for the endogeneity issue. The 
instrumental variable approach does not change the result of the origi­
nal analysis. Third, we also control for net equity financing to see if eq­
uity financing explains the relationship between corporate investment 
and stock liquidity, as proposed by Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2000). 
Eckbo et al. (2000) argue that equity offering leads to an increase in 
stock liquidity, implying the effect of financing decision on stock liquid­
ity. However, we find that corporate investment indeed improves stock 
liquidity, independent of equity financing. Overall, our robustness check 
confirms that corporate investment indeed contributes to stock 
liquidity.
Our study complements a growing study on the determinants of 
stock liquidity. The literature addresses several factors such as firm's 
characteristics (capitalization and stock price), trading activity (volume 
and information asymmetry), and market maker (funding liquidity). 
However, only a few studies explore the implication of firm's activity 
for stock liquidity. Among them are Eckbo et al. (2000) and Gopalan, 
Kadan, and Pevzner (2012). This study contributes to this line of re­
search by discovering the role of corporate investment in shaping
Table 2
Correlations.
This table presents correlations among variables. AMH is the logarithm of the Amihud (2002) daily liquidity measure which is an absolute daily return scaled by daily dollar trade volume 
measured over one month after the fiscal year ends. LAMH is past AMH measured over three months after the previous fiscal year ends. CAP (or CRD) is capital expenditure (plus R&D), 
scaled by beginning-of-year assets and subtracted from the prior three-year moving average capital expenditure (plus R&D). SIZE is the logarithm of market capitalization in the month 
that the fiscal year ends. PRC is the logarithm of a stock price in the month that the fiscal year ends. TNV is the average of the logarithm of daily turnover in the month that the fiscal year 
ends. VOL is the logarithm of the standard deviation of daily stock return in the month that the fiscal year ends. RET is a stock return in the fiscal year. CB is cash balance, scaled by begin- 
ning-of-year assets. The sample spans the year of 1971 to 2012.
LAMH CAP CRD SIZE PRC TNV VOL RET CB
AMH 0.919 -0.042 - 0.036 - 0.921 -0.756 - 0.529 0.403 -0.193 -0.026
LAMH - 0.031 - 0.024 - 0.905 - 0.687 - 0.484 0.378 0.010 - 0.015
CAP 0.871 0.036 0.084 0.000 - 0.051 0.097 0.072
CRD 0.032 0.080 - 0.007 - 0.050 0.100 0.080
SIZE 0.763 0.276 - 0.447 0.141 - 0.008
PRC 0.178 - 0.569 0.285 0.018
TNV 0.200 0.135 0.084
VOL - 0.097 0.053
RET 0.093
stock liquidity. Moreover, our analysis is also relevant to the market ef­
ficiency literature because we can explore the link between corporate 
investment and market anomaly by highlighting the evolution of stock 
liquidity in response to a change in the risk attributable to corporate 
investment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents data 
and preliminary analysis. Sections 3 discusses our main empirical anal­
ysis while Section 4 explains the robustness check. Finally, Section 5 
concludes the paper.
2. Data and primary analysis
2.1. Data
We use common stocks (share code of 10 or 11) on the COMPUSTAT 
and CRSP data set over the period of 1971 to 2012.8 Conforming to the 
investment literature (Baker, Stein, & Wurgler, 2003), our analysis in­
cludes those stocks whose book equity is greater than 10 million dollars 
while it excludes regulated or financial firms, those firms whose prima­
ry SIC classification is between 4900 and 4999 or between 6000 and 
6999, as the investment literature does. As a result, the sample contains 
total 74,280 firm-year observations, on average 1768 firms per year.
8 We exclude the pre-1971 data because of a small number of observations.
9 To separate the effect of prior corporate investment from that of the current one, we 
estimate past stock liquidity over three months after the previous fiscal year ends. We ob­
tain similar results for the six or other month window.
10 However, past stock liquidity, LAMH, shows a weak positive association with stock 
return.
11 A nominal capital expenditure (plus R&D) measure, not an abnormal one, is also pos­
itively related to stock liquidity, with a correlation of - 0.099 (or - 0.100) with AMH 
based on unreported analysis.
12 We obtain similar results for the formation methods based on different number of 
portfolios.
13 Therefore, our analysis is an event study.
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics. A measure of stock liquidity 
is AMH, the logarithm of the Amihud (2002) daily illiquidity measure 
which is an absolute daily return scaled by daily dollar trade volume 
measured over one month after the fiscal year ends. Amihud (2002) 
argues that AMH is interpreted as daily price response associated 
with one dollar of trading volume, thus serving a rough measure of 
the price impact of the Kyle (1985)'s λ. Kyle (1985) demonstrates 
that a market maker sets an equilibrium price by following his pric­
ing strategy and determining the price impact, the Kyle (1985)'s λ. 
In the dataset, AMH varies from - 22.355 to - 10.919. CAP (or 
CRD) is our main explanatory variable for corporate investment. Fol­
lowing Titman et al. (2005), we define corporate investment as the 
deviation from the prior three-year moving average corporate in­
vestment. Specifically, CAP (or CRD) is capital expenditures, 
Compustat Item 128 (plus R&D, Item 46), scaled by beginning-of- 
year book assets (Item 6) and subtracted from the prior three-year 
moving average capital expenditure (plus R&D).
We use several control variables. SIZE is the firm size defined as the 
logarithm of capitalization in the month that the fiscal year ends. PRC is 
the logarithm of a stock price in the month that the fiscal year ends. TNV 
is the average of the logarithm of daily turnover in the month that the 
fiscal year ends. VOL is the logarithm of the standard deviation of daily 
stock return in the month that the fiscal year ends. RET is a stock return 
over the fiscal year. We also add CB to capture the effect of asset liquid­
ity, as shown in Gopalan et al. (2012). CB is cash balance (Item 1), scaled 
by beginning-of-year assets.
Table 2 presents correlations among variables. AMH is very persis­
tent with a correlation of 0.919 with past AMH, measured over three 
months after the previous fiscal year ends, consistent with the liquidity 
literature.9 AMH varies with firm size, stock price level, and trade vol­
ume, as addressed in the literature. We also find that high return vola­
tility harms stock liquidity while high stock return benefits stock 
liquidity. This observation is consistent with inventory risk and funding 
liquidity (Grossman & Miller, 1988; Brunnermeier & Pedersen, 2009).10 
Moreover, stock liquidity increases in asset liquidity, CB, consistent with 
Gopalan et al. (2012). Finally, both CAP and CRD are weakly correlated 
with AMH. CAP shows a correlation of - 0.042 with AMH while CRD ex­
hibits a correlation of - 0.036.11 However, corporate investment shows 
a relatively strong association with stock return with a correlation of 
0.097 or 0.100, consistent with Eisfeldt (2004).
2.2. Preliminary analysis
As a preliminary analysis, we examine how corporate investment af­
fects subsequent stock liquidity in two ways. The first analysis focuses 
on the behavior of stock liquidity over time while the second one 
shows a two-way sorting portfolio analysis.
In the first analysis, we present two figures showing a series of 
monthly stock liquidity for portfolios formed on corporate investment. 
First, we form portfolios by sorting stocks based on abnormal corporate 
investment in the fiscal year and dividing them into three terciles.12 Sec­
ond, we calculate subsequent stock liquidity, AMH, for each portfolio 
over six months after the fiscal year ends.13 The results are shown in 
Figs. 1 and 2 which illustrate the behavior of stock liquidity from the 
bottom tercile with low CAP or CRD (P1) to the top tercile with high 
CAP or CRD (P3). In Figs. 1 and 2, we observe that corporate investment 
contributes to subsequent stock liquidity. That is, high corporate invest­
ment leads to high stock liquidity. This pattern persists over the follow­
ing six months. Interestingly, we also find that stock liquidity on average 
improves over time regardless of a level of corporate investment.
Fig. 1. Stock liquidity for portfolios based on corporate investment (CAP). Fig. 1 describes 
the behavior of subsequent stock liquidity, AMH, measured over six months after the fiscal 
year ends, for each portfolio formed on abnormal corporate investment (CAP). P1 presents 
the bottom tercile with low CAP, while P3 shows the top tercile with high CAP.
In the second analysis, we report the result for a two-way sorting 
portfolio analysis. Considering the persistence of stock liquidity, as 
shown in Table 2, we control for past stock liquidity to examine if corpo­
rate investment is indeed associated with subsequent stock liquidity. 
Therefore, we sort stocks into five liquidity portfolios (from LIQ to 
ILLIQ) based on past AMH. Then, we divide each liquidity portfolio 
into either High or Low corporate investment subgroup. Finally, we 
measure subsequent stock liquidity for each portfolio over six months 
after the fiscal year ends. The results are presented in Table 3 where 
Panels A and B show our analysis, based on CAP and CRD respectively.
As expected, stock liquidity is strongly associated with past stock li­
quidity. That is, when past stock liquidity is high, current stock liquidity 
is also high. More importantly, stock liquidity increases in corporate in­
vestment even for the same level of past stock liquidity. We find a signif­
icant difference in stock liquidity between High and Low portfolios, 
regardless of a level of past stock liquidity. Moreover, this pattern per­
sists over time for both CAP and CRD. Overall, our primary analysis pro­
vides basic empirical evidence on the relationship between corporate 
investment and subsequent stock liquidity, i.e. a positive association.
3. Empirical analysis
3.1. Corporate investment and stock liquidity
In this section, we formally examine the effect of corporate invest­
ment on stock liquidity by using the Fama and Macbeth (1973) cross­
sectional regression analysis.14 Specifically, we analyze the cross­
sectional relationship between abnormal corporate investment and 
subsequent stock liquidity in a yearly regression for the sample period 
of 1971 to 2012. Our estimation model for stock liquidity is as follows.
i4 The panel regression analysis provides qualitatively the same evidence as the cross­
sectional analysis does.
i5 In this sense, our analysis is similar to an event study.
i6 We interpret RET as a measure for firm-specific funding liquidity for market makers. A 
popular measure for funding liquidity is the TED spread, defined as three-month USD 
LIBOR rate minus US Treasury bill yield. However, the TED spread is suitable for market­
wide funding liquidity, not for firm-specific funding liquidity. We believe that past stock 
return, RET, is more likely to reflect the cross-sectional variation in funding liquidity be­
cause traders or market makers can pledge the relevant security itself as collateral to ob­
tain financing.
AMHi,t = at + ß1INVi;t-i + y1LAMHi,t-i + y2SIZEi/-i + Y3PRCi;t-i 
+Y4 TNVi;t—i + Y5VOLi;t-i + Y6RETi;t-i + Y7CBi;t-i + η^ 
(1)
In the analysis, we include abnormal corporate investment as a main 
independent variable along with several stock liquidity determinants 
such as past stock liquidity and stock characteristics. We use abnormal 
corporate investment to control for the feedback effect of stock liquidity 
on corporate investment. According to the literature, stock liquidity ex­
pands the set of profitable investment opportunities and increases cor­
porate investment (Derrien & Kecskes, 20i3; Becker-Blease & Paul, 
2006). Therefore, considering the feedback effect, we attempt to capture 
the effect of an exogenous change in corporate investment on stock li­
quidity. In particular, following Titman et al. (2005), we define an exog­
enous change in corporate investment as the deviation from the prior 
Fig. 2. Stock liquidity for portfolios based on corporate investment (CRD). Fig. 2 describes 
the behavior of subsequent stock liquidity, AMH, measured over six months after the fiscal 
year ends, for each portfolio formed on abnormal corporate investment (CRD). Pi presents 
the bottom tercile with low CRD, while P3 shows the top tercile with high CRD.
three-year moving average corporate investment. Moreover, we also 
control for the feedback effect by including past stock liquidity. In 
other words, given the persistence of stock liquidity, the presence of 
past stock liquidity can exclude the possibility that corporate invest­
ment reflects just past stock liquidity. In this regression setting, we re­
peat the analysis for stock liquidity measured over different months 
after the fiscal year ends.i5
Table 4 exhibits the empirical analysis. We confirm many exiting 
regularities and summarize them as follows. First, past stock liquidity 
is strongly related to current stock liquidity with the coefficient of 
0.i30 to 0.i63 and a t-statistic of 8.74 to i0.i2. This result confirms 
the persistence of stock liquidity, consistent with our analysis in 
Table 2 and the liquidity literature. Second, both firm size and stock 
price contribute to stock liquidity, as shown in the negative coefficients. 
When firm size (or stock price) is big (or high), firm enjoys high stock 
liquidity. Those stocks are known to have high stock liquidity. Third, 
both turnover and return volatility also govern stock liquidity. Specifi­
cally, stocks with high turnover and low volatility exhibit high stock li­
quidity. We observe this because market makers bear a low level of 
inventory risk for those stocks so that they provide more stock liquidity 
(Grossman & Miller, i988). Our analysis confirms the literature. Fourth, 
cash balance positively relates to stock liquidity. As Gopalan et al. 
(20i2) show, firms with a high level of liquid asset show a high level 
of stock liquidity. That is, the coefficients of CB, cash balance, are signif­
icantly negative, consistent with Gopalan et al. (20i2).
Moreover, we observe that funding liquidity matters to stock liquid­
ity as well. In other words, high funding liquidity, measured by high 
stock return, leads to high stock liquidity, as shown in the negative co­
efficients of RET.i6 This analysis is consistent with the intuition of 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009). In the meantime, we also interpret 
this finding in a different context. That is, one can argue that stock li­
quidity improves due to high stock performance, not corporate invest­
ment, because high corporate investment usually accompanies high 
stock return (Eisfeldt, 2004). Thus, we address this issue by examining 
whether corporate investment still has an independent effect on stock 
liquidity after controlling for high stock return. After all, our finding 
demonstrates that a good market condition itself indeed affects stock li­
quidity. However, we argue that corporate investment also contributes 
to stock liquidity independently, as addressed below.
Finally, we find that corporate investment indeed contributes to 
stock liquidity. That is, corporate investment significantly improves 
stock liquidity, as shown in the negative coefficient of INV. For example, 
the coefficient of INV is - 0.069 (or - 0.055) with a t-statistic of - 2.35
Table 3
Stock liquidity sorted on past stock liquidity and corporate investment.
This table presents the time-series averages of AMH measured over k (k = 1,2... 6) months after the fiscal year ends, sorted on past AMH and then CAP (or CRD). Past AMH is measured 
over three months after the previous fiscal year ends. AMH is the logarithm of the Amihud (2002) daily liquidity measure which is an absolute daily return scaled by daily dollar trade 
volume. CAP (or CRD) is capital expenditure (plus R&D), scaled by beginning-of-year assets and subtracted from the prior three-year moving average capital expenditure (plus R&D). 
The difference in AMH between Low and High CAP (or CRD) portfolios is also reported, along with t-statistics in parentheses. The sample spans the year of 1971 to 2012.
Panel A: CAP
1 month 2 month 3 month
Low High Diff Low High Diff Low High Diff
LIQ - 20.206 - 20.301 - 0.095 -20.233 - 20.333 - 0.100 - 20.238 - 20.336 - 0.097
(-73.37) (- 74.31) (-3.23) (-73.26) (-74.37) (- 3.39) (-73.42) (- 74.49) (- 3.36)
2 - 17.945 -18.066 - 0.121 -17.982 - 18.106 - 0.124 - 17.993 - 18.116 - 0.122
(-65.76) (- 66.20) (-5.87) (-65.56) (-66.28) (- 6.53) (-65.45) (-66.39) (- 6.66)
3 - 16.531 -16.654 - 0.123 -16.561 - 16.688 - 0.127 - 16.579 - 16.702 - 0.123
(-63.38) (- 65.55) (-5.05) (-63.69) (-65.80) (- 5.28) (-63.71) (- 65.59) (-5.23)
4 - 15.140 - 15.258 - 0.118 -15.174 - 15.292 - 0.118 - 15.198 - 15.317 - 0.119
(-67.84) (- 67.37) (-4.19) (-68.40) (-68.38) (- 4.19) (-68.32) (-68.49) (-4.23)
ILLIQ - 13.273 - 13.411 - 0.138 -13.313 - 13.452 - 0.139 - 13.350 - 13.494 - 0.143
(-73.93) (- 76.49) (-5.01) (-75.21) (-78.24) (- 5.20) (-75.70) (- 78.55) (-5.27)
Panel A: CAP
4 month 5 month 6 month
Low High Diff Low High Diff Low High Diff
LIQ - 20.239 -20.336 - 0.096 -20.245 - 20.341 - 0.096 - 20.244 - 20.341 - 0.097
(-73.41) (- 74.50) (-3.32) (-73.31) (-74.49) (- 3.29) (-73.32) (-74.49) (- 3.36)
2 - 17.997 -18.118 - 0.121 -18.003 - 18.121 - 0.118 - 18.003 - 18.116 - 0.113
(-65.51) (- 66.53) (-6.49) (-65.20) (-66.32) (- 6.23) (-65.08) (-66.33) (- 6.10)
3 - 16.586 -16.707 - 0.121 -16.598 - 16.715 - 0.117 - 16.601 - 16.715 - 0.114
(-63.99) (- 65.66) (-5.17) (- 63.92) (-65.44) (- 5.02) (-63.80) (-65.24) (- 4.84)
4 - 15.208 - 15.328 - 0.120 -15.216 - 15.338 - 0.121 - 15.218 - 15.339 - 0.121
(-68.34) (- 68.54) (-4.40) (- 68.32) (-68.38) (- 4.64) (-68.15) (-68.13) (- 4.89)
ILLIQ - 13.374 - 13.522 - 0.148 -13.395 - 13.546 - 0.151 - 13.407 - 13.552 - 0.145
(-76.44) (- 78.65) (-5.45) (-77.09) (-78.41) (-5.32) (-77.76) (-78.63) (- 4.95)
Panel B: CRD
1 month 2 month 3 month
Low High Diff Low High Diff Low High Diff
LIQ - 20.202 - 20.306 - 0.104 -20.230 - 20.336 - 0.106 - 20.236 - 20.339 - 0.103
(-73.51) (- 74.17) (-3.59) (-73.46) (-74.17) (-3.67) (-73.60) (- 74.31) (- 3.58)
2 - 17.940 -18.072 - 0.132 -17.976 - 18.112 - 0.137 - 17.986 - 18.123 - 0.137
(-65.52) (- 66.43) (-6.03) (-65.36) (-66.46) (- 6.40) (-65.27) (-66.55) (- 6.48)
3 - 16.519 -16.666 - 0.148 -16.550 - 16.699 - 0.148 - 16.568 - 16.713 - 0.144
(-63.48) (- 65.43) (-5.92) (-63.80) (-65.67) (- 6.01) (-63.84) (- 65.44) (- 5.92)
4 - 15.133 - 15.265 - 0.132 -15.163 - 15.303 - 0.139 - 15.187 - 15.329 - 0.142
(-67.95) (- 67.27) (-4.72) (-68.60) (-68.21) (- 5.15) (-68.47) (-68.37) (- 5.35)
ILLIQ - 13.269 - 13.415 - 0.146 -13.309 - 13.456 - 0.147 - 13.349 - 13.495 - 0.147
(-74.02) (- 76.41) (-5.47) (-75.29) (-78.21) (- 5.88) (-75.79) (-78.54) (- 5.85)
Panel B: CRD
4 month 5 month 6 month
Low High Diff Low High Diff Low High Diff
LIQ - 20.236 -20.338 - 0.102 -20.241 - 20.345 - 0.104 - 20.240 - 20.345 - 0.105
(-73.59) (- 74.30) (-3.49) (-73.59) (-74.19) (- 3.55) (-73.63) (- 74.16) (-3.61)
2 - 17.989 - 18.125 - 0.136 -17.994 - 18.130 - 0.136 - 17.993 - 18.126 - 0.133
(-65.36) (- 66.67) (-6.61) (-65.09) (-66.42) (- 6.79) (-65.00) (-66.41) (- 6.70)
3 - 16.576 -16.717 - 0.141 -16.589 - 16.723 - 0.134 - 16.594 - 16.723 - 0.128
(-64.12) (- 65.52) (-5.86) (-64.00) (-65.35) (- 5.59) (-63.88) (- 65.15) (- 5.40)
4 - 15.195 - 15.341 - 0.146 - 15.204 - 15.350 - 0.146 - 15.204 - 15.352 - 0.148
(-68.47) (- 68.45) (-5.66) (-68.39) (-68.35) (- 6.03) (-68.24) (-68.08) (- 6.38)
ILLIQ - 13.373 - 13.522 - 0.149 -13.395 - 13.546 - 0.151 - 13.404 - 13.555 - 0.151
(-76.49) (- 78.68) (-6.01) (-77.10) (-78.52) (- 6.03) (-77.97) (-78.57) (- 5.76)
(or - 2.12) for CAP (or CRD) when AMH is measured over one month 
after the fiscal year ends. Moreover, we observe the same pattern for 
AMH measured over up to three months after the fiscal year ends.17 In 
17 In the analysis of AMH measured over four to six months, we find significant results 
for CAP while obtaining weaker results for CRD, unlike the portfolio analysis in Table 3. 
The results are available upon request.
addition to a statistical significance, the contribution of corporate in­
vestment is also economically substantial. In other words, when a firm 
increases corporate investment by one standard deviation, stock liquid­
ity increases by 7.7% for CAP and 7.9% for CRD respectively, as estimated 
by AMH. After all, this finding suggests that corporate investment plays 
a significant role in determining stock liquidity over a certain period of 
time, which is independent of many well-known determinants for 
stock liquidity.
Table 4
Corporate investment and stock liquidity: cross-sectional analysis.
This table presents the time series average of the Fama and Macbeth (1973) yearly cross-sectional regression analysis. The dependent variable is AMH measured over k (k = 1, 2,3) months 
after the fiscal year ends. AMH is the logarithm of the Amihud (2002) daily liquidity measure which is an absolute daily return scaled by daily dollar trade volume. INV is CAP or CRD. CAP 
(or CRD) is capital expenditure (plus R&D), scaled by beginning-of-year assets and subtracted from the prior three-year moving average capital expenditure (plus R&D). LAMH is past AMH 
measured over three months after the previous fiscal year ends. SIZE is the logarithm of market capitalization in the month that the fiscal year ends. PRC is the logarithm of a stock price in 
the month that the fiscal year ends. TNV is the average of the logarithm of daily turnover in the month that the fiscal year ends. VOL is the logarithm of the standard deviation of daily stock 
return in the month that the fiscal year ends. RET is a stock return in the fiscal year. CB is cash balance, scaled by beginning-of-year assets. The Newey and West (1987) standard error 
corrected t-statistics are presented in parentheses. The sample spans the year of 1971 to 2012.
CAP CRD
1 month 2 month 3 month 1 month 2 month 3 month
Const. - 6.200 -5.933 -5.793 - 6.200 -5.933 - 5.794
(-33.77) (-34.43) (- 33.32) (-33.77) (-34.43) (- 33.32)
INV - 0.069 - 0.071 -0.087 - 0.055 - 0.056 - 0.065
(-2.35) (-2.15) (-2.45) (-2.12) (-1.83) (-1.93)
LAMH 0.130 0.152 0.163 0.130 0.152 0.163
(8.74) (9.77) (10.12) (8.74) (9.78) (10.12)
SIZE - 0.908 - 0.888 -0.875 - 0.908 -0.888 - 0.875
(-57.18) (-54.40) (- 51.63) (-57.15) (-54.41) (- 51.64)
PRC - 0.246 - 0.242 - 0.240 - 0.246 - 0.242 - 0.240
(-9.35) (-9.71) (- 9.80) (-9.36) (-9.71) (- 9.81)
TNV - 0.770 - 0.730 - 0.701 - 0.770 -0.730 - 0.701
(-62.16) (-54.22) (- 48.20) (-62.15) (-54.23) (- 48.21)
VOL 0.437 0.414 0.401 0.437 0.414 0.401
(16.45) (15.71) (14.86) (16.43) (15.69) (14.84)
RET - 0.162 -0.179 -0.184 - 0.162 -0.179 - 0.184
(-5.01) (-5.41) (- 5.96) (-5.01) (-5.41) (- 5.97)
CB - 0.040 - 0.053 - 0.057 - 0.041 - 0.053 - 0.058
(-2.11) (-2.52) (-2.42) (-2.13) (-2.56) (-2.47)
Adj. R-squared (%) 95.8 96.0 95.9 95.8 96.0 95.9
Taken together, we argue that our analysis is consistent with the no­
tion that corporate investment plays a role in shaping stock liquidity by 
decreasing the risk of a stock. According to Berk et al. (1999), optimal 
corporate investment can decrease the risk of a stock by converting 
growth options into assets in place. A number of asset pricing studies 
support this proposition in the time series or cross-sectional analysis 
of expected returns (Carlson et al., 2004; Zhang, 2005; Li et al., 2009; 
and Liu et al., 2009). Moreover, the market microstructure literature 
documents that a change in the risk affects the pricing strategy of mar­
ket makers, leading to a change in the price impact, i.e. stock liquidity 
(Kyle, 1985). After all, our analysis provides the implication of the recent 
development of corporate investment research for the market micro­
structure literature by illustrating how stock liquidity reacts to a change 
in the risk caused by corporate investment. To our best knowledge, this 
study is the first empirical analysis linking corporate investment to 
stock liquidity by emphasizing the risk shift from corporate investment.
It is interesting to compare our analysis with the implication of 
Gopalan et al. (2012). Consistent with the main seasonal equity offering 
(SEO) literature, Gopalan et al. (2012) implicitly argue that corporate 
investment increases asset risk in their analysis for the relationship be­
tween asset liquidity and stock liquidity.18 However, our analysis pro­
vides evidence on a positive role of corporate investment in affecting 
the risk, conforming to the real option-based explanation for SEO 
(Carlson et al., 2006). We point out that our study provides direct evi­
dence on the causality between corporate investment and stock liquid­
ity by investigating the effect of corporate investment on subsequent 
stock liquidity while Gopalan et al. (2012) illustrate the contemporary 
relationship between corporate investment and concurrent stock 
liquidity.
18 See Ritter (2003) for the implication of corporate investment for the fundamental risk. 
Ritter (2003) argue that lower leverage from equity offerings is more than offset by in­
creased operating risk, leading to a decrease in expected returns if issuing companies em­
bark on aggressive expansion plans with the money raised in an SEO. Thus, our finding is 
not in line with the main SEO literature but with the real option-based explanation on 
SEOs.
19 However, Titman et al. (2005) illustrate a weaker effect of corporate investment on 
expected returns for financially-constrained firms. Titman et al. (2005) interpret firms 
with less financial flexibility as firms with less investment discretion and expect 
financially-constrained firms to show weaker return reversals, based on the behavioral 
finance.
Overall, we discover the role of corporate investment in shaping 
stock liquidity. Moreover, we argue that corporate investment 
contributes to stock liquidity because optimal corporate investment de­
cision leads to a decrease in the risk by interpreting the recent real 
option-based corporate investment study in the market microstructure 
context.
3.2. The interaction effect with financial constraints
In this section, we extend our analysis to investigate if corporate in­
vestment affects stock liquidity universally. In other words, we examine 
what factors influence the effect of corporate investment on stock li­
quidity. Specifically, we test the effect of financial constraints on the re­
lationship between corporate investment and stock liquidity.
Since Fazzari et al. (1988) document the effect of financial con­
straints on corporate investment, many studies investigate the relation­
ship between imperfect capital market and corporate investment. 
According to Fazzari et al. (1988), financial constraints prevent firms 
from financing all the desired investments. Therefore, financially- 
constrained firms are likely to show a low sensitivity of corporate in­
vestment to profitable investment opportunities other things equal, as 
shown in Kaplan and Zingales (1997). In other words, given the level 
of corporate investment, investment opportunities are likely to be 
more profitable for financially-constrained firms than for financially- 
unconstrained firms. Based on this inference, we hypothesize that 
given any change in corporate investment, financially-constrained 
firms are likely to experience a greater risk shift and show a stronger ef­
fect of corporate investment on stock liquidity.19
We use two financial constraints variables: the Kaplan and Zingales 
(1997; KZ) index and firm size. For the KZ index, following Baker et al. 
(2003), we use the revised KZ index, a composite index based on cash 
flow (CF), cash dividend (DIV), cash balance (CB), and leverage (LEV),
Table 5
Corporate investment and stock liquidity for financial constraints (KZ index).
This table presents the time series average of the Fama and Macbeth (1973) yearly cross-sectional analysis, sorted on the Kaplan and Zingales (1997; KZ) index. The dependent variable is 
AMH measured over three months after the fiscal year ends. AMH is the logarithm of the Amihud (2002) daily liquidity measure which is an absolute daily return scaled by daily dollar 
trade volume. INV is CAP or CRD. CAP (or CRD) is capital expenditure (plus R&D), scaled by beginning-of-year assets and subtracted from the prior three-year moving average capital ex­
penditure (plus R&D). LAMH is past AMH measured over three months after the previous fiscal year ends. SIZE is the logarithm of market capitalization in the month that the fiscal year 
ends. PRC is the logarithm of a stock price in the month that the fiscal year ends. TNV is the average of the logarithm of daily turnover in the month that the fiscal year ends. VOL is the 
logarithm of the standard deviation of daily stock return in the month that the fiscal year ends. RET is a stock return in the fiscal year. CB is cash balance, scaled by beginning-of-year assets. 
The Newey and West (1987) standard error corrected t-statistics are presented in parentheses. The sample spans the year of 1971 to 2012.
CAP CRD
High Low Diff High Low Diff
Const. -5.795 -5.625 - 0.170 -5.794 -5.628 - 0.166
(-34.30) (- 29.20) (- 2.08) (-34.30) (- 29.18) (-2.02)
INV -0.132 - 0.024 - 0.108 -0.114 -0.012 - 0.102
(-3.06) (- 0.62) (- 1.98) (-2.82) (- 0.35) (-2.05)
LAMH 0.144 0.187 - 0.043 0.144 0.188 - 0.043
(9.02) (10.97) (- 5.35) (9.01) (10.98) (-5.36)
SIZE -0.902 -0.850 - 0.052 - 0.902 - 0.850 - 0.053
(-49.65) (- 52.43) (- 5.81) (-49.63) (- 52.54) (-5.83)
PRC -0.265 -0.216 - 0.049 - 0.265 -0.216 - 0.049
(-9.11) (- 9.98) (- 3.03) (-9.11) (- 9.98) (-3.03)
TNV -0.706 - 0.683 - 0.023 -0.706 - 0.683 - 0.022
(-47.43) (- 44.46) (-2.91) (-47.41) (- 44.40) (-2.89)
VOL 0.393 0.401 - 0.008 0.392 0.401 - 0.008
(12.42) (16.11) (- 0.50) (12.40) (16.06) (-0.50)
RET -0.173 - 0.196 0.023 - 0.173 -0.196 0.023
(-5.08) (- 6.45) (1.20) (-5.08) (- 6.45) (1.18)
CB -0.116 - 0.084 - 0.033 -0.117 - 0.084 - 0.033
(-3.08) (-3.42) (- 0.87) (-3.10) (- 3.44) (-0.87)
Adj. R-squared (%) 95.1 96.4 95.1 96.4
normalized by beginning-of-year book asset. The index is defined as fol­
lows.
(2)
Moreover, we assume that financial constraints are also related to 
firm size measured by sales level, consistent with Gopalan et al.
(2012). Therefore, financially-constrained firms are characterized with 
high KZ-index score or small size.
We implement this analysis by examining whether corporate invest­
ment shows a different effect on stock liquidity across financial constraints. 
That is, we sort a universe of stocks into two groups based on financial con­
straints every year. Then, we run a separate regression for each group and 
compare the sensitivity of stock liquidity to corporate investment. In par­
ticular, we run the Fama and Macbeth (1973) cross-sectional regression
Table 6
Corporate investment and stock liquidity for financial constraints (firm size).
This table presents the time series average of the Fama and Macbeth (1973) yearly cross-sectional analysis, sorted on firm size, measured by sales. The dependent variable is AMH mea­
sured over three months after the fiscal year ends. AMH is the logarithm of the Amihud (2002) daily liquidity measure which is an absolute daily return scaled by daily dollar trade volume. 
INV is CAP or CRD. CAP (or CRD) is capital expenditure (plus R&D), scaled by beginning-of-year assets and subtracted from the prior three-year moving average capital expenditure (plus 
R&D). LAMH is past AMH measured over three months after the previous fiscal year ends. SIZE is the logarithm of market capitalization in the month that the fiscal year ends. PRC is the 
logarithm of a stock price in the month that the fiscal year ends. TNV is the average of the logarithm of daily turnover in the month that the fiscal year ends. VOL is the logarithm of the 
standard deviation of daily stock return in the month that the fiscal year ends. RET is a stock return in the fiscal year. CB is cash balance, scaled by beginning-of-year assets. The Newey and 
West (1987) standard error corrected t-statistics are presented in parentheses. The sample spans the year of 1971 to 2012.
CAP CRD
Small Big Diff Small Big Diff
Const. -5.579 -5.960 0.381 -5.578 -5.960 0.382
(-29.69) (- 37.57) (2.68) (-29.58) (- 37.59) (2.67)
INV -0.111 - 0.040 - 0.071 - 0.079 - 0.021 - 0.057
(-3.15) (- 0.70) (-1.38) (-2.22) (- 0.40) (-1.24)
LAMH 0.152 0.177 - 0.025 0.152 0.177 - 0.025
(9.11) (11.47) (- 3.83) (9.12) (11.45) (-3.79)
SIZE -0.895 - 0.851 - 0.044 - 0.895 - 0.851 - 0.044
(-34.70) (- 56.74) (-2.51) (-34.71) (- 56.61) (-2.51)
PRC - 0.249 - 0.226 - 0.023 - 0.249 - 0.226 - 0.023
(-7.59) (- 9.61) (-1.20) (-7.60) (- 9.62) (-1.20)
TNV -0.683 -0.702 0.020 - 0.683 - 0.703 0.020
(-48.45) (- 46.58) (2.54) (-48.44) (- 46.49) (2.55)
VOL 0.392 0.394 - 0.001 0.392 0.394 - 0.001
(12.54) (13.19) (- 0.06) (12.52) (13.19) (-0.07)
RET -0.202 - 0.172 - 0.030 - 0.202 -0.172 - 0.030
(-5.93) (- 5.70) (-1.67) (-5.94) (- 5.68) (-1.69)
CB -0.099 -0.010 - 0.089 - 0.100 -0.011 - 0.089
(-4.48) (- 0.30) (- 3.23) (-4.53) (- 0.33) (-3.24)
Adj. R-squared (%) 91.0 95.7 91.0 95.7
Table 7
Change in return volatility and corporate investment.
This table presents the time-series average of the coefficient in the Fama and Macbeth 
(1973) yearly regression. Except for corporate investment (INV), each variable is a change 
in characteristics measured between the month that the fiscal year ends and three months 
after the fiscal year ends. The dependent variable is a change in the logarithm of the stan­
dard deviation of daily stock return. DTNV/D PRC is a change in the logarithm of the aver­
age daily turnover/a stock price. INV is CAP (or CRD) which is capital expenditure (plus 
R&D) scaled by assets. The t-statistics are presented below the coefficients. The Newey 
and West (1987) standard error corrected t-statistics are presented in parentheses. The 
sample spans the year of 1971 to 2012.
CAP CRD




DPRC - 0.422 - 0.422
(-18.28) (-18.26)
INV - 0.035 - 0.034
(-1.68) (-1.76)
Adj. R-squared (%) 15.1 15.1
for AMH measured over three months after the fiscal year ends.20 Tables 5 
and 6 present the result for each group and the difference between two 
groups sorted on the KZ index and firm size, respectively.
20 We obtain qualitatively the same results for AMH measured over one or two months 
after the fiscal year ends.
21 Several stock liquidity determinants, such as firm size, stock price, turnover, or cash 
balance, are also major explanatory variables for firm's expected returns. Moreover, 
Whited and Wu (2006), Gomes et al. (2006), and Livdan et al. (2009) address the effect 
of financial constraints risk on expected returns. 22 We check the validity of instrument variables. The result is available upon request.
The following are noticeable findings. On one hand, stock liquidity is 
more sensitive to several determinants for financially-constrained 
firms. We observe this regularity for both financial constraints variables, 
as shown in Tables 5 and 6. It is because those determinants also relate 
to the fundamental risk. Financially-constrained firms are so vulnerable 
to the fundamental risk that market makers respond more strongly to a 
variation in the fundamental risk for financially-constrained firms, 
showing a bigger change in stock liquidity.21
On the other hand, corporate investment has a stronger effect on stock 
liquidity for financially-constrained firms. That is, we find that financially- 
constrained firms drive the corporate investment-stock liquidity pattern 
in Tables 5 and 6. Specifically, high KZ-index or small firms exhibit a sig­
nificant effect of corporate investment on stock liquidity while low KZ- 
index or big firms show a weaker effect. For example, Table 5 shows 
that the coefficient of INV is - 0.132 (or - 0.114) with a t-statistic of 
- 3.06 (or - 2.82) for CAP (or CRD) in the regression of high KZ-index 
firms. However, the coefficient of INV is just - 0.024 (or - 0.12) with a 
t-statistic of - 0.62 (or -0.35) for CAP (or CRD) in the analysis of low 
KZ-index firms. Moreover, we also observe a significant difference in 
the effect of corporate investment between high and low KZ-index 
firms with a t-statistic of - 1.98 for CAP and - 2.05 for CRD, respectively.
Table 6 presents the same pattern for the analysis sorted on firm size. 
That is, small firms show a significant effect of corporate investment on 
stock liquidity with the coefficient of INV of - 0.111 (or - 0.079) and a 
t-statistic of - 3.15 (- 2.22) for CAP (or CRD) while big firms exhibit a 
weaker effect with the coefficient of INV of - 0.040 (or - 0.021) and a 
t-statistic of - 0.70 (or - 0.40) for CAP (or CRD). However, there is no 
significant difference in the effect of corporate investment between 
small and big firms in Table 6.
Overall, our analysis confirms that there is an interaction effect be­
tween financial constraints and corporate investment in the context of 
stock liquidity. Specifically, we show that financially-constrained firms 
drive the corporate investment-stock liquidity pattern. We argue that 
this analysis is also consistent with our risk-based interpretation for 
the relationship between corporate investment and stock liquidity. As 
the literature addresses (Whited & Wu, 2006; Gomes, Yaron, & Lu, 
2006), financial constraints can affect, specifically increase, expected re­
turn. Thus, an increase in the cost of capital leads firms to accept invest­
ment opportunities with a higher internal rate of return. After all, 
financially-constrained firms are likely to take on more profitable in­
vestment opportunities given the corporate investment. Therefore, 
when a risk shift occurs, financially-constrained firms are likely to ex­
hibit stronger improvement in stock liquidity. Taken together, the cur­
rent analysis strengthens our risk-based interpretation for the role of 
corporate investment in shaping stock liquidity.
4. Robustness check
In this section, we investigate whether our empirical regularity is ro­
bust to any alternative economic explanations. We summarize the find­
ings as follows.
First, we examine whether optimal corporate investment indeed de­
creases the risk of a stock. According to Berk et al. (1999), corporate invest­
ment relates to mostly the systematic risk of a stock. Therefore, one might 
raise the possibility that higher corporate investment leads to lower sys­
tematic risk, not lower total risk, questioning the implication for stock li­
quidity. We address this issue in two approaches. The first approach is to 
highlight the recent literature on stock liquidity. This line of studies pro­
vides evidence on a negative association between the systematic compo­
nent of the risk and stock liquidity. (Brunnermeier & Pedersen, 2009; 
Comerton-Forde, Hendershott, Jones, Moulton, & Seaholes, 2010; Nagel, 
2012) Therefore, these studies imply that stock liquidity is not immune 
to a change in systematic risk even though corporate investment affects 
systematic risk only. The second approach demonstrates the effect of cor­
porate investment on total risk. Thus, we empirically investigate whether 
corporate investment contributes to stock return volatility. Table 7 pre­
sents a result for the cross-sectional regression of a change in return vola­
tility on corporate investment. At a significance level of 10% for a one-sided 
test, stock return volatility is likely to decrease for firms with high corpo­
rate investment even after controlling for other well-known relevant var­
iables such as trade volume and stock returns. Taken together, corporate 
investment indeed decreases the risk, both total and systematic risk.
Second, we investigate the feedback effect of stock liquidity on cor­
porate investment. The literature documents that a positive shock on 
stock liquidity leads to a decrease in the cost of equity, which in turn ex­
pands the set of profitable investment opportunities and increases cor­
porate investment. (Becker-Blease & Paul, 2006; Derrien & Kecskes, 
2013) Given this reverse causality, we might suspect that there is an 
endogeneity problem. We examine this issue in two ways. First, we in­
vestigate whether our measure for corporate investment indeed reflects 
prior stock liquidity. Following Baker et al. (2003), we estimate corpo­
rate investment based on a marginal q, the market-to-book value ratio 
of equity, and current cash flow in the cross-sectional regression. The re­
sult is shown in Table 8. Stock liquidity has a marginal or insignificant 
effect on our measure for corporate investment, ‘abnormal’ corporate 
investment, as shown in Panel B of Table 8, while prior stock liquidity in­
deed significantly increases ‘raw’ corporate investment in Panel A. That 
is, our measure for corporate investment is not subject to the feedback 
effect of stock liquidity. Second, we directly control for endogeneity 
problem by using the two-stage least square (2SLS) analysis. Following 
the existing corporate investment literature, i.e. Baker et al. (2003), we 
employ the market-to-book value ratio of equity and the current cash 
flow as instrument variables in the first-stage regression. Table 9 
shows the result for the two-stage least square (2SLS) analysis. The sec­
ond and fourth columns present the 2SLS analysis for stock liquidity 
while the first and third columns show the first-stage regression for cor­
porate investment. In summary, the 2SLS does not change the result of 
the original analysis in Table 4 except for some changes in stock return 
and cash balance, confirming our main findings.22
Table 8
The feedback effect of stock liquidity on corporate investment.
This table presents the time series average of the Fama and Macbeth (1973) yearly cross-sectional regression analysis. The dependent variable is INV which is CAP or CRD. CAP (or CRD) is 
capital expenditure (plus R&D), scaled by beginning-of-year assets and subtracted from the prior three-year moving average capital expenditure (plus R&D). MB is the logarithm of the 
market-to-book ratio of equity. CF is cash flow, scaled by beginning-of-year assets. LAMH is past AMH measured over k (k = 1, 2, 3) months after the previous fiscal year ends. AMH is the 
logarithm of the Amihud (2002) daily liquidity measure which is an absolute daily return scaled by daily dollar trade volume. The Newey and West (1987) standard error corrected t- 
statistics are presented in parentheses. The sample spans the year of 1971 to 2012.
Panel A: Nominal INV
CAP CRD
1 month 2 month 3 month 1 month 2 month 3 month
Const. -0.061 - 0.061 -0.061 - 0.189 -0.189 -0.190
(-4.36) (- 4.38) (-4.42) (-10.02) (-10.07) (-10.12)
MB 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.036 0.036 0.036
(6.08) (6.10) (6.11) (9.19) (9.22) (9.25)
CF 0.240 0.240 0.239 0.083 0.083 0.082
(5.19) (5.19) (5.19) (1.01) (1.00) (1.00)
LAMH -0.001 - 0.001 - 0.001 - 0.001 -0.002 - 0.002
(-2.33) (- 2.28) (-2.36) (-2.41) (-2.56) (-2.69)
Adj. R-squared (%) 10.5 10.5 10.5 18.2 18.3 18.2
Panel B: INV
CAP CRD
1 month 2 month 3 month 1 month 2 month 3 month
Const. 0.026 0.026 0.025 0.060 0.059 0.058
(0.68) (0.67) (0.65) (1.34) (1.33) (1.31)
MB - 0.010 -0.010 - 0.010 -0.016 -0.016 - 0.016
(-1.43) (-1.46) (- 1.48) (- 1.99) (-2.03) (- 2.05)
CF 0.136 0.135 0.135 0.153 0.152 0.152
(6.08) (6.08) (6.06) (5.99) (5.98) (5.96)
LAMH - 0.001 -0.001 - 0.001 -0.002 - 0.002 - 0.002
(-1.32) (-1.42) (-1.53) (-1.54) (-1.69) (-1.82)
Adj. R-squared (%) 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.5 2.5 2.5
Third, we examine if stock liquidity improves due to equity financing 
accompanying corporate investment. The reason is as follows. Equity 
capital is often a major source for financing corporate investment. 
Moreover, an increase in equity capital itself, i.e. seasoned equity 
offerings, leads to an increase in stock liquidity, as shown in Eckbo 
et al. (2000). Thus, one might suspect that an increase in stock liquidity 
is attributable to equity financing, not corporate investment. To investi­
gate this alternative explanation, we control for equity financing by
Table 9
Corporate investment and stock liquidity: 2 SLS analysis.
This table presents the time series average of the two-stage least square analysis based on yearly cross-sectional regression. The dependent variable is AMH measured over three months 
after the fiscal year ends on the second/fourth column or INV on the first/third column. AMH is the logarithm of the Amihud (2002) daily liquidity measure which is an absolute daily return 
scaled by daily dollar trade volume. INV is CAP or CRD. CAP (or CRD) is capital expenditure (plus R&D), scaled by beginning-of-year assets and subtracted from the prior three-year moving 
average capital expenditure (plus R&D). LAMH is past AMH measured over three months after the previous fiscal year ends. SIZE is the logarithm of market capitalization in the month that 
the fiscal year ends. PRC is the logarithm of a stock price in the month that the fiscal year ends. TNV is the average of the logarithm of daily turnover in the month that the fiscal year ends. 
VOL is the logarithm of the standard deviation of daily stock return in the month that the fiscal year ends. RET is a stock return in the fiscal year. CB is cash balance, scaled by beginning-of- 
year assets. MB is the logarithm of the market-to-book ratio of equity. CF is cash flow, scaled by beginning-of-year assets. The Newey and West (1987) standard error corrected t-statistics 





Const. -0.054 -6.035 -0.036 -5.979
(-2.00) (-33.13) (-0.92) (-24.76)
INV -3.880 - 3.009
(-2.03) (-2.01)
LAMH -0.004 0.154 -0.001 0.156
(-1.52) (10.97) (-0.30) (9.97)
SIZE -0.009 -0.903 -0.006 - 0.898
(-2.35) (-56.35) (-1.30) (-49.46)
PRC 0.012 -0.181 0.017 - 0.204
(5.85) (-4.10) (7.08) (-8.04)
TNV -0.003 -0.713 -0.002 -0.712
(-1.28) (-47.14) (-0.42) (-40.57)
VOL -0.004 0.378 -0.005 0.370
(-1.83) (13.27) (-1.88) (11.85)
RET 0.013 -0.095 0.006 -0.143
(5.00) (-1.57) (0.61) (-2.61)
CB 0.004 0.045 -0.011 - 0.037






Corporate investment and stock liquidity for equity financing.
This table presents the time series average of the Fama and Macbeth (1973) yearly cross-sectional analysis, sorted on equity financing. The dependent variable is AMH measured over three 
months after the fiscal year ends. AMH is the logarithm of the Amihud (2002) daily liquidity measure which is an absolute daily return scaled by daily dollar trade volume. INV is CAP or 
CRD. CAP (or CRD) is capital expenditure (plus R&D), scaled by beginning-of-year assets and subtracted from the prior three-year moving average capital expenditure (plus R&D). LAMH is 
past AMH measured over three months after the previous fiscal year ends. SIZE is the logarithm of market capitalization in the month that the fiscal year ends. PRC is the logarithm of a 
stock price in the month that the fiscal year ends. TNV is the average of the logarithm of daily turnover in the month that the fiscal year ends. VOL is the logarithm of the standard deviation 
of daily stock return in the month that the fiscal year ends. RET is a stock return in the fiscal year. CB is cash balance, scaled by beginning-of-year assets. The Newey and West (1987) stan­
dard error corrected t-statistics are presented in parentheses. The sample spans the year of 1971 to 2012.
CAP CRD
No Yes Diff No Yes Diff
Const. - 5.564 -5.872 0.309 - 5.564 -5.873 0.309
(- 31.04) (-33.09) (3.11) (-31.07) (-33.06) (3.12)
INV - 0.122 -0.058 - 0.064 - 0.109 -0.052 - 0.057
(-2.14) (-1.40) (-1.07) (-1.99) (-1.32) (- 0.96)
LAMH 0.196 0.136 0.061 0.197 0.136 0.061
(11.91) (8.28) (5.89) (11.95) (8.26) (5.93)
SIZE - 0.839 -0.912 0.073 - 0.839 -0.912 0.073
(- 52.13) (-47.76) (6.55) (-52.29) (-47.75) (6.59)
PRC - 0.238 -0.231 - 0.008 - 0.238 -0.231 - 0.007
(- 8.96) (-10.35) (-0.59) (-8.95) (-10.38) (- 0.58)
TNV - 0.679 -0.705 0.026 - 0.679 -0.705 0.026
(- 43.64) (-49.46) (2.85) (-43.68) (-49.47) (2.86)
VOL 0.387 0.405 -0.018 0.387 0.405 - 0.018
(13.55) (13.58) (-1.18) (13.50) (13.59) (-1.19)
RET - 0.252 -0.137 -0.115 - 0.252 -0.137 -0.115
(-7.97) (-4.91) (-6.48) (-7.99) (-4.90) (- 6.55)
CB - 0.032 -0.078 0.046 - 0.033 - 0.079 0.045
(- 0.97) (-3.12) (1.62) (-1.01) (-3.16) (1.60)
Adj. R-squared (%) 96.1 95.2 96.1 95.2
sorting stocks into two groups based on net equity financing and com­
paring these two groups in a separate regression. Table 10 presents 
the analysis. On one hand, we find that equity financing indeed affects 
stock liquidity. In other words, unconditional stock liquidity is higher 
for firms with equity financing. In the analysis of CAP, a constant term 
is - 5.872 for firms with equity financing while it is - 5.564 for firms 
with no equity financing. Moreover, the difference is statistically signif­
icant with a t-statistic of - 3.11. We observe the same pattern for CRD. 
This outcome is consistent with Eckbo et al. (2000). On the other hand, 
we obtain an interesting outcome. That is, corporate investment has a 
significant effect on stock liquidity only for firms with no equity financ­
ing. For example, the coefficient of INV is - 0.122 (or - 0.109) with a t- 
statistic of - 2.14 (or - 1.99) for CAP (or CRD) in the regression of firms 
with no equity financing. On the other hand, the coefficient of INV is just 
- 0.058 (or - 0.052) with a t-statistic of - 1.40 (or - 1.32) for CAP (or 
CRD) in the analysis of firms with equity financing. Therefore, this anal­
ysis addresses that an increase in stock liquidity is attributable to corpo­
rate investment as well as equity financing.
5. Conclusion
The recent corporate investment literature argues that optimal cor­
porate investment decreases the risk of a stock. Moreover, the market 
microstructure literature addresses that a change in the risk affects the 
pricing strategy of market makers, leading to a change in the price im­
pact. In this study, we establish the relationship between corporate in­
vestment and stock liquidity by connecting the recent development of 
the corporate investment research to the market microstructure 
literature.
This study demonstrates that corporate investment contributes to 
stock liquidity by providing empirical evidence on the role corporate in­
vestment in shaping stock liquidity. Moreover, we show that stock li­
quidity improves more apparently for firms with financial constraints 
because those firms are likely to experience a greater risk shift. After 
all, we argue that corporate investment decreases the risk of a firm 
which, in turn, causes a market maker to improve stock liquidity.
Our study complements a growing study on the determinants of 
stock liquidity by discovering a role of corporate investment in shaping 
stock liquidity. Moreover, our analysis is also relevant to the market ef­
ficiency literature because we can explore the link between corporate 
investment and a change in arbitrage activity or market anomaly by 
highlighting a role of corporate investment in stock liquidity.
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